In an essay that is worth at least a couple reads, Robert Jenson asks,
"What if it were true?" Here's an excerpt:
“In 451 the Council of Chalcedon set out to establish Cyril of Alexandria’s teaching, in the less alarming of its forms, as the norm of teaching about the person of Christ. It was Cyril’s great concern that everything the Gospels say about their protagonist is to be taken as true of one and the same concrete subject, that whether the Gospels say Jesus told a parable or forgave sins, whether he wept for Lazarus or raised Lazarus, we are talking about the same personal protagonist. So the council, starting off on Cyril’s line, laid it down as its primal doctrine that 'one and the same' is the subject of the whole gospel-narrative.
“Particularly, in the council’s polemic context, it is one and the same one who is born of Mary in Bethlehem and born eternally, begotten of the Father. And we can very straightforwardly continue with Cyril: it is one and the same who has the divine attributes displayed in the Gospels and who has the human attributes therein displayed, one and the same who forgives sin and who is tempted, one and the same who prays in anguish and rules all history, one and the same thought it took a few more councils to say it out loud who is crucified and who orders the galaxies, one and the same who as Luther loved to say lies muling and puking in his mother’s arms and the while restrains Satan.
“Chalcedon begins with the `one and the same,’ and so far, one may say, so very good. But when the fathers at Chalcedon moved on to the necessary work of setting boundaries for the contending schools of theology, outlawing the errors that each side feared the other must really be thinking, they did not quite dare carry on from their beginning. The formulas they produced have been memorized by centuries of theological students and have frustrated all of them, by their surface profundity and material elusiveness. Notoriously, the council stipulated that Christ has two 'natures,' one divine and one human, which while remaining unmixed, unadulerated, etc., are united in 'one hypostasis.' The trouble is, that they refrained from unpacking the notion of `one hypostasis,’ which one would have thought was more or less the whole point. Chalcedon’s formulas fulfill some ecumenical and occasionally disciplinary functions, but conceptually they are close to being empty.
“Then finally the council appended the famous letter of Pope Leo as an authorized interpretation of the whole, which at least on its face says something rather different than the face value of the council’s primal teaching. According to Leo, one entity, 'the divine nature' does the glory bits and another entity, 'the human nature,' does the suffering bits, each 'with' the other. Ever since, at least in the West, we have found great relief in the notion that each of Christ’s natures does its own thing. We have been relieved to think that while of course it is the one hypostasis of Christ who died on the cross, he did it in such fashion ‘according to his human nature' that we do not need to think that the God the Son himself was ontically affected. We have been relieved to think that while of course it is the one hypostasis of Christ who rules the universe, this is in such fashion 'according to his divine nature' that Jesus qua human participates in this rule only by way of special but nevertheless creaturely human endowments. Christology, we have supposed, is a matter of discerning the relation between two entities, Christ’s `divine nature’ and his `human nature,’ and we have exploited that way of thinking to shy away from Cyril’s blunt faithfulness to the narrative unity of the Gospels.
“But what if Cyril’s teaching, and the teaching with which the council began its decree, were true in the dumb sense? What if, given the Incarnation, there were not two entities for Christology to relate to each other, but just the one person for Christology to describe? Perhaps indeed with such analytical terms as `divine’ or `human’ or `nature?’ What if talk of distinct human and divine `natures’ of Christ were therefore only a sometimes useful, or even necessary, abstraction from what is actually given? What if it were the unadulterated fact of the matter, that this particular human individual with all his peculiarities, the executed Palestinian Jew, the prophet and rabbi from Nazareth, is the second identity of God? Getting down to the level I want to probe: that he is the being who appears in Scripture and theology as the Logos of God and God the Son?”